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THE ELEMENTS OF CRIME 
ELSPE1H A TTWOOLL 
APART from those offences that are defined to exclude such con-
siderations, 1 the commission of a crime is normally understood to 
involve the presence of mens rea on the part of the actor. And the 
corresponding maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea is a 
well established one. 
A crime is thus taken, standardly at least, to be comprised of 
two main elements: the acrus reus or guilty act, ·comprising all the 
physical or material ingredients of the crime; and the mens rea or 
guilty mind, comprising all the mental ones. Within this traditional 
dichotomy, the actus reus is seen as an event occurring in space 
and time and, as such, open to observation and verification. Al-
though brought about by the actor and hence ascribable to him it is 
not in any sense part of him. The element of mens rea, however, 
while also accepted as existing in space and time, is not ob-
servable and is, hence, unverifiable. And, although it ·must be im-
puted to the actor, it is internal to him and thus an aspect of him. 
On the above account, then, a crime consists in two separate 
elements linked through the actor - a guilty act perpetrated by him 
and a guilty mind with respect to it on his part. This account is, 
however, too simplistic by far and highly misleading in conse-
quence. 
In the first place it may well be the existence of a guilty mind 
on the part of the actor that renders an otherwise innocent act of 
his a guilty one. In fact the whole import of the maxim actus non 
facit reum nisi mens sit . rea is to the effect that it is, in whole or 
in part, the presence of mens rea that qualifies an actus as reus. 
Gordon recognises as much when he writes 'strictly speaking it 
is improper to call any situation an (lf:lus reus unless it was 
created with mens rea', although he rather detracts from this re-
cognition by adding 'but it is possible and convenient to treat 
mens rea as different from any other defeasing factor. The term 
"actus reus• can then be used for situations that would be crimi-
1Strict liability offences as created by statute, prominent in e.g. road 
traffic and food and drugs legislation. 
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nal were they accompanied by mens rea; a term is necessacy for 
. all the objective or extemal ingredients of a crime and "actus 
reus" is the obvious one to use'. 2 
Such a resolution of the problem is not, however, altogether 
satisfactory. One may define homicide as the destruction of a self-
existent human life. Homicide, then, dearly qualifies as an actus. 
But not all homicide is necessarily criminal - it may well not be 
so where casual or coerced or justifiable. 3 Thus the destruction of 
a self-existent human life may not be an actus reus; rather, the 
actus reus 'homicide' is the destruction of self-existent human life 
in a particular kind of way - a way typically characterised by 
mens rea. 4 
Thus the forbidden or guilty act and the guilty mind do not exist 
side by side. Instead, the forbidden act involves the presence of a 
guilty mind on the part of the actor among the elements by which 
it is defined. Accordingly, it becomes apparent that the term actus 
reus does not merely serve to identify the physical or material, 
objective or external ingredients of a crime but rather comprises 
the totality of the elements involved. The actus reus and the reum 
or crime are one. 
Various objections, however, may be raised to this equation. 
First, -it leaves us without any term for the physical or material, 
objective or external ingredients of a crime, taken in isolation 
from the mental ones. But it will be contended below that such 
analytic isolation is anyway undesirable. · 
Secondly, it may be argued that to equate the actus reus and the 
crime is to leave us without means of d i stinguishing between a 
crime as a category of forbidden human. behaviour and some par-
ticular manifestation of it: that the term crime should be reserved 
for the category and the term actus reus for the. individual occur-
rence. 
It is, of course, obvious that each actual instance of, say, 
'homicide' will differ in terms of person, time, place method etc. 
from any other. But so equally, does each individual example of a 
table or chair differ, in some measure at least, from any other. 
And we do not feel any need to use different terms for designating 
2 Gerald H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotl(lnd, (Edinburgh, 1967) 
p. 60. 
3 By accident or mischance, under force or duress, in the furtherance of 
public justice or out of necessity or in self.defence. 
4 0r, on the kind of account given by H.L .A. Hart in 'Legal Responsibility 
and Excuses' in Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philo-
sophy of Law (Oxford, 1968), pp. 28-53, in a way characterised .by ab-
sence of the excusing conditions that negate mens rea. 
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tables and chairs as class concepts and actual examples of tables 
and chairs. Further the term actus reus is preferred for analysis 
since it gives some indication of the factors to be analysed and 
lacks the emotional connotations of 'a crime'. 
Thirdly, the equation of the actus reus and the crime may be 
said to ignore the fact that some, ·although relatively few, crimes 
are constituted by omissions rather than acts. 'Failing to observe 
a traffic sign' might be cited as an instance of such. It has some-
times been argued that no real problem is involved here and that 
the distinction between acts and omissions is a false one, since 
in all cases statements about omissions can be reframed in posi-
tive terms. Even if this is so, the approach seems an unneces-
sarily laborious one and liable to introduce distortions. And, 
although the discussion below concentrates on acts, it i s hoped 
that the analysis given will be accepted as equally viable where 
omissions are concerned. If so, the alleged defect in the equation 
may be remedied simply enough either by subsuming omissions 
under the class of acts or, probably more properly, by equating 
instead an actus vel omissus reus and a crime. 
But, · whether or not the main equation is accepted, enough 
should have been said to show that actus r.eus is not a simple 
concept. Nor~ as investigation will demonstrate, is mens rea. The 
present intention is to consider more closely what elements are 
involved in the concepts of actus. and mens rea and to point to the 
ways in which these may combine to form an actus reus. 
Acros 
If one accepts, temporarily, .the explanation given of the actus 
as the physical or material, objective or external, ingredients of a 
crime, it may be seen to be divisible into three parts. These are 
(a) the action, (b) the material circumstances of the action and 
(c)the consequences or results of the action~in-material-circumstan­
ces. 
By action here is meant simply a muscular movement.5 It is at 
this juncture that the only difference between an analysis of acts 
and an analysis of omissions occurs. In the case of omissions 
there is a corresponding lack of muscular movement - there is an 
inaction. But this inaction occurs in material circumstances and 
may be followed by consequences in precisely the same way as an 
action. 
By material circumstances are meant those practical contexts 
5 Contrary e.g. i:o H.L.A. Hart, 'Acts of Will and Responsibility', Loe. cit., 
pp. 90-112. 
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within which the action takes place. Thus the movement which 
may be termed 'crooking a finger' takes on a different character 
according as the finger is already around the trigger of a gun or is 
being held up to a friend. In the first case, the activity becomes 
that of shooting, in the second case that of beckoning. 
By the consequences or results of the action-in-material cir-
cumstances are meant those events we treat as causally connec-
ted with it, such as the bullet entering the person at whom the gun 
was pointed or the approach of the friend beckoned to. However 
not all crimes include any consequences of the action-in-material-
circumstances as part of their definition. Theft6 and indecent ex-
posure7 are clear examples of what may be termed conduct, as 
opposed to result, crimes. 8 And the relationship between circum-
stances and consequences is rather more complex than it initially 
seems. 
First, the dividing line between a circumstance and a conse-
quence is not always an easy one to draw. For example, the fact 
of the bullet leaving the gun may be seen as a consequence of the 
trigger being pulled. But it may equally be seen as a circumstance 
precedent to someone being hit by that bullet. And the latter event 
may itself become a circumstance precedent to the death of the 
person hit. 
Result crimes are usually defined by what is regarded as the 
end point in some causal chain9 and all events prior to this are 
treated _as circumstances precedent to it. Nonetheless it is pos-
sible, and sometimes necessary, to make a distinction between 
the immediate and the consequential circumstances of an action -
as, for instance, between the immediate circumstance of the finger 
being crooked round the trigger of a gun which is loaded and the 
consequential circumstance of a bullet leaving the muzzle. For 
the point or points in the causal chain at which the various ques-
tions relating to mens rea are asked may be effective in deter-
mining the nature of the actus reus committed or, indeed, whether 
the accused person is guilty of any crime at all. 10 
6 Commonly defined as 'the di shone st taking of the goods of another'. See 
Gordon, op. cit., pp. 401-2, 406. 
7 Exposure of those parts of the person usually concealed co a particular 
person or persons in a public place or co a person not consenting as a 
gesture of sexual invitation or gratification on the pare of the accused. 
See Gordon, op .. cit., pp. 848-9. 
1 Cf. the distinction made by Gordon, op. cit., p.61. 
9 Cf. the distinction in English law between grievous bodily hann and 
murder. 
10 See, for example, the case of Chandl.er v. D.P.P. [1964] A.C. 763. 
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Secondly, human behaviour never occurs in isolation. How we 
describe the behaviour of X, what we consider to be his actus at 
any given time, may depend largely on our purpose in describing 
it. Thus it is possible to make the following statements, all of 
them true, at one and the same time: 'X is changing gear', 'Xis
driving', 'X is driving a foreign car', 'X is going into town' and 'X 
is going shopping'. Further, if we ask the question 'why?' in rela­
tion to all these statements in tum, we may obtain the following 
answers. 'Because he is slowing down for a red light', • Because 
he is in a hurry', 'Because he prefers foreign cars', 'Because he 
wants to do some shopping' and 'Because there is no food in the 
house'. 
Thus, no matter what behaviour we choose to isolate as an 
actus, it will always have circumstances and consequences beyond 
itself. 11 There are thus certain practical and theoretical difficul­
ties in det�rmining what, within certain causally related events, is 
to be accounted an actus for the purpose of allocating it to some 
particular category of actus reus.
For example, where- consequences are concerned, ,when is the 
death of the person injured too remote from the injury received for 
it to be appropriate to find the gunman guilty of murder? What 
should happen when some novus actus interveniens alters the 
course of events - as for example a bungled operation 'causing' 
the death of a person otherwise not seriously injured? Where has 
an actus reus been committed if the actus is 'split', the initial 
action occurring in one jurisdiction and the consequences in 
another. 12 And such questions are further complicated by the in­
troduction of matters relating to mens rea - for instance, how far 
should the mens rea of the accused in relation to the forseeable 
consequences of his action be projected onto the unforseeable 
ones? 
Further, · while an actus is usually conceived as having a de­
fined starting point, namely the muscular movement initiating the 
consequences, the situation is rarely as s imple as this. Some 
judgment has to be made as to what it is that sets off the causal 
chain. And the movement selected may be more or less remote 
from the consequences or, it may be not one ·movement but several. 
A clear example of this is that of the motorist who, though uncon­
scious at the time of crashing, is nonetheless convicted of a 
11 As Salmond points out, an act h as no natural boundaries, Jurispru­
dence (11th edn.)pp. 401-2. 
12 As for instance where a shot is fired across a border or poison is sent
from one country to another and death or injury results, 
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driving offence - his actus being taken to have begun at the time 
of his overconsumption of alcohol. 
And, even though an actus may be taken to have certain physi­
cal movements as its starting point, these movements themselves 
are the product of some cause. The question thus arises as to the 
extent, if any, that factors determining the action should be re­
garded as part of the actus. And, as an examination of the elements 
of mens rea will show, the law does not treat them as totally ir­
relevant to it. 
Especially in a system which relies heavily on precedent, any 
particular category of actus reus is liable to constant modification 
by reference to the forms of actus that are treated as falling within 
it, But the physical, material or external aspects of the actus 
reus are not as 'objective' as they might at first seem. For the de­
limination of the actus, in terms of initial cause and final con• 
sequence, is clearly an evaluative process, conditioned largely 
by the purpose for which it is done. 13 
But while matters of the above kind a re cause-related, ques­
tions of causality come into more direct account in establishing 
the coherence of the actus as delimited - in justifying the linking 
of the action-in-immediate-circumstance, · the c onsequential cir­
cumstances and the consequences. And causal judgments, having 
their basis in induction, can never be certain but only more or less 
probable. Thus the greater the number of consequential circum­
stances that intervene between the action in immediate circum­
stances (the initial cause) and the final consequences, the less 
reliable the judgments made.
14 
Thus the concept of an actus, even insofar as it can be an­
alysed in isolation from any mental elements, is not an altogether 
straight-forward one. And it becomes even less so once questions 
of mens rea are admitted. 
MENS REA 
To mens rea questions of (a) voluntariness and (b) intention. 
recklessness and negligence are usually regarded as appropriate. 
And matters of motive are sometimes also brought into account, • 
It has, however, been argued that the elements of mens rea are 
not open to any positive explanation. For example, H.L.A. Hart 
has written • ... what is meant by the mental element in criminal 
13H,L,A.Hart & A.M.Honore, Causati9n in the Law (Oxford, 1959), 
Otap. II. 
14 And the connections established by the law may well be tenuous ones
- e.g. R. v, Jarmain [1946] K.B. 74.
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liability (mens rea) is only to be understood by considering cer-
tain defences or exceptions, such as Mistake of Fact, Accident, 
Coercion, Duress, Provocation, Insanity, Infancy, most of which 
have come to be admitted in most crimes, and in some cases ex-
clude liability altogether, ·and in others merely 'reduce' it. The 
fact that these are admitted as defences or exceptions constitutes 
the cash value of the maxim 'actus non ••• ns 
And, he continues, 'in pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp of a gen-
eral formula, legal theorists have sought to impose a spuriou~ 
unity ••. upon these heterogeneous defences or exceptions, sug-
gesting that they are admitted as merely evidence of the absence 
of some single element ('intention') or in more recent theory, two 
elements ('foresight' and 'voluntariness') universally required as 
necessary conditions of criminal responsibility'. 16 
Hart admits that it is possible to represent the admission of 
such defences as showing the existence of a mental element or 
elements but argues that in order to determine what they are and 
'how their presence and absence are established it is necessary 
to refer back to the various defences; and then these general 
words assume merely the status of convenient but sometimes mis-
leading summaries expressing the absence of all the various con-
ditions referring to the agent's knowledge or will which eliminate 
· or reduce responsibility'. 17 
Hart's argument is not without force and it is substantiated in 
some measure by the operation of the legal process, in the United 
Kingdom atleast. For, while in relation to the 'actus' it is for the 
prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the onus 
shifts where mens rea is concerned. It becomes for the accused to 
show, if only on the balance of probabilities, that he acted while 
insane or by mistake or in self-defence. If he is successful in 
this then the existence of mens rea is negated and he is not open 
to conviction for the crime . . 
Hart's analysis does provide a valuable caveat against attempt-
ing to impose a spurious unity of the kind he rejects. It is clearly 
unsatisfactory to build a positive and unified concept of mens rea 
on the basis of a heterogeneous collection of instances of its 
absence. It appears equally unsatisfactory, however, to have no 
greater grasp of mens rea than . that which may be obtained by set-
ting out a list of excusing conditions. 
15 'The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights' Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Socie.ty, XLIX (1949), pp.171-94. • 
16 ibis. 
17 ib.id. 
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In fact, Hart's analysis ignores the implications of the very 
variety of the defences to which he points. For it is not only con-
venient but sometimes imperative to classify such defences, to the 
end of showing the level at which they operate in relation to the 
actus. And, within these limits, the defences can be seen as an 
expression, albeit in negative form, of positive theses about what 
is involved in human behaviour. 
There exists, for example, a common - although perhaps un-
tenable18 - thesis about human beings to the effect that they are 
possessed of free will - that they are capable of exercising 
choic;;J -in and control over what they do. But even those most con-
vinced of the thesis admit that there are circumstances in which 
this does not apply. Normally behaviour is voluntary but excep-
tionally it is involuntary and in such event it is inappropriate 19 to 
praise or blame the 'agent' for what has occurred. 
The precise conditions under which behaviour is accepted to be 
involuntary are subject to considerable variation. In some legal 
systems they are limited to instances where the agent is uncon-
scious or in some other automatic state - to cases where it might 
acceptably be argued that he was not really 'an agent' or 'acting' 
at all. But other systems also admit behaviour to ~e involuntary 
where it occurs under coercion - whether it be occasioned by 
direct physical force or some subtler means. 
What such conditions of involuntariness have in common, how-
ever, is the idea that the exercise of choice and control by the 
agent has been vitiated. And the question is raised whether mat-
ters of voluntariness do properly belong to the realm of mens rea. 
For, in the cases of unconsciousness and automatism at least, it 
can be argued that they do not simply disqualify the actus from 
being reus but rather preclude the constitution of an actus at 
all. 20 In such cases the behaviour is traced to certain physiologi· 
cal causes, 2·1 and questions about the insights and attitudes of the 
accused are thereby excluded. Certain extreme cases apart, 22 the 
same does not apply where coercion and duress are concerned. 
18If the claims of deteIDlinists are to be believed. 
Ill Whether because pointless or unjust. 
20It can thus be argued that involuntariness is a proper defence where 
suict liability offences are concerned. Cf. Hill v. Baxter [1958] 1 Q.B. 
277. 
21 The courts are reluctant to admit automatism as a defence unless it 
can be traced to such. See the remarks of Viscount Kilmuir in B1rltty v. 
Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] A.C. 386. 
22 e.g. hypnotism, direct physical force. 
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Here there is an actus, albeit a reluctant one, but the coercion or 
duress may preclude it from being reus. 23 
These two types of case where behaviour may be treated as in­
voluntary have a common genesis in the view that certain causal 
factors may operate on human beings so as to render nugatory any 
choice or control on their part. Yet the cases differ in terms of 
the nature of the causal factors involved and as to the degree to 
which these factors are regarded as determining behaviour. 
Yet, even though the factors of the second type may be seen as 
negating mens rea, they are clearly not internal to the 'psyche' of 
the accused. It is the existence of the coercion or duress, a�· not 
• the fear or other emotions engendered by it, that exculpates. Thus,
on a return to the analysis of an actus as an action-in-circumstan­
ces etc., coercion and duress can be seen as ranking amongst the
material circumstances that surround the action. And to claim that
it is lack of mens rea here that p recludes the actus from being
reus is only to justify the inclusion of coercion and duress as ex­
cluding conditions -.it is not to explain how the concept operates
in\logical and practical terms.
To the ··mental state of the actor questions about motive and in­
tention are, however, properly appropriate. But the criminal law
treats the motives of an accused person as largely irrelevant.
While they may be used to explain his actus and even to diminish
his liability to punishment, they do not affect its nature. At least,
this is the theory. However, to date no really satisfactory account
of motives has been given and a similarly satisfactory account of
their operation in the criminal law must be dependent on such.
Although no attempt at such a philosophical account will be
made here , it would seem appropriate to mention a few of the
senses in which 'motive' may be used. For example, 'motive' may
characterise the dominant emotion attendant upon the action -
pity, fear, ,anger; or a character trait of the actor - greed, vanity;
or the type of satisfaction the actus is expected to yield - money,
revenge.
For the most part, the law is not concerned with motive in any
of these senses. A fraud is still a fraud whether perpetuated as a
practical joke or for pecuniary advantage. 24 And w ords such as
'wilfully' or 'maliciously' in an indictment are treated as meaning
simply intentionally or recklessly. Equally �corruptly', in one
230r in some systems merely diminish liability to punishment.
24 Gordon, op. cit., p. 559.
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English case25 was held to mean 'deliberately offering a person 
money with intent that he should enter a corrupt bargain' and the 
Court of Criminal Appeal held that the accused's motive - that of 
actually exposing corruption - was irrelevant. And, in Chandler v. 
D. P. P., 26 where the accused were charged with conspiring to enter 
an aircraft base for a purpose prejudicial co the interests of the 
state, their motive, that of bringing about nuclear disarmament, 
was ruled out of account. 27 
A case in which matters of motive were, ·arguably, treated as 
relevant, however, was that of R. vs. Stea~e. 28 Steane was charged 
under the Defence Regulations with doing an act likely to assist 
the enemy with intent to assist the enemy. The act concerned was 
that of broadcasting for the Germans, under the threat that his 
wife and children would be taken co a concentration camp if he did 
not. Steane was acquitted on appeal on the basis that, since he 
was acting under subjection, he could not be presumed co have 
intended co assist the enemy, even though this was a natural and 
probable consequence of his broadcasting. 
This decision has been strongly criticised. Glanville Williams29 
has argued that the case should properly have been decided on the 
basis of duress. And Gerald Gordon has written that it 'involves 
a departure not merely from the rule that a man is presumed to 
intend the natural consequences of his aces, if such a rule exists, 
but from the generally accepted view chat intention and motive are 
separate, that the law is interested only in intention in ascribing 
.responsibility, and that a man muse be taken co intend the certain 
consequences of his actings, -whether or not he desires them, and 
for whatever reason he embarks on them'. 30 
Were the test meant co be an entirely objective one, however, 
the second pare of the charge would be redundant. And while it is 
indeed proper co keep separate the concepts of intention and mo-
tive, it might be argued chat the decision can be justified on two 
separate grounds. First, chat the word 'intent' was inappropriately 
used in chis context and chat the reference was co motive, taken in 
the sense of the type of satisfaction chat the actus was expected 
25 R. v. Smith. [ 1960] 2 Q.B. 423. However, see Campbell v. H.M. Adv. 
1941 J.C. 86 and the doubts expressed by Gordon (op. cit. pp. 947-8) as 
to whether the same decision as in Smith would be reached in Scotland. 
216 [ 1964] A. C. 763. 
27 Their purpose was treated as that of obstructing aircraft. 
28[1947] 1 K.B. 997. 
29 Glanville L. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 2nd edn. (Lon-
don, 1961) p. 41. 
30 Gordon, op. cit., p. 389. 
29 
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to yield. More plausibly, perhaps, it could be maintained that a 
matter of intention was indeed involved, but that if any subjective 
account of intention is to be given 1t must be heavily dependent 
on inference from motives. And, the motive in Steane's case being 
alternatively describable as fear for his family or the protection of 
his family, an intention to assist the enemy could not be inferred 
from it. 
Nor are motives solely relevant in respect of the consequences 
of an action. For example exposure of 'those parts of the person 
that are usually concealed' is only criminal where, inter alia, 'the 
exposure is made to a particular person or persons in such a way 
as to indicate an improper motive on the part of the accused, that 
is to say, where the exposure is a fonn of sexual gesture or invi· 
tation, and is something from which the exposer derives gratifica-
tion, something which is for him a sexual act'. 31 
And there are instances where motives are taken into account in 
a more general fashion. As Gordon writes 'Where a crime has been 
committed in the absence of circumstances indicating a corrupt 
and malignant disposition or wickedness, or, as it is often called, 
malice, then, even although it has been intentionally committed, 
and so is reus according to modern ideas of mens rea, the court 
will almost certainly take the absence of malice into account in 
passing sentence'. 32 Further, the jury may actually reduce the 
charge of murder to one of culpable homicide on this basis, .if 
indeed the prosecution has not already limited itself to the latter 
indictment. 
Thus motives, in the possible senses of the term taken here, 
may qualify behaviour in such a way that it either falls within the 
scope of one actus reus rather than another or else does not fall 
within the scope of an actus reus at all. Yet the role accorded to 
motives by the law is both an inconsistent and an incoherent one 
- and is probably dictated more by policy considerations in in-
dividual cases than by any other factors. If, however, as seems 
likely, motive explanations are a species of causal explanations, 
then some pattern might be made to emerge by linking them with 
causal factors that are accepted as precluding the constitution of 
an actus reus or mitigating liability for it. Thus, as already hap-
pens with coercion, duress and provocation, one would look to the 
objective state of affairs that engenders the motive rather 'than to 
the motive itself. 
Such an approach would not, ·though, fully illuminate the role 
31 Gordon, op. cit. p. 848. See M' Kenzie v. Whyte ( 1864) 4 Irving 570. 
32 Gordon, op. cit. P• 195. 
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played by motive in relation to intention. To appreciate why this 
is so, it is necessary to look more closely at the concept of inten· 
tion. And such a procedure reveals that, in terms of mens rea at 
least, intention is to be understood in at least two senses. 
The first sense of intention is equivalent to knowingly, awarely, 
deliberately. This involves knowledge and awareness of the action 
and its immediate circumstances and foresight of the consequen· 
tial circumstances and consequences. It is in fact difficult to con-
ceive of an action (in the sense of muscular movement) of which 
the actor is unaware unless that movement is anyway already 
classed as involuntary, 33 although it is possible that such may 
occur. However, there are clearly numerous instances where 
people are unaware, or else not fully aware, of the circumstances 
surrounding their actions. And there are also numerous instances 
where people, although well enough aware of the circumstances of 
their actions, do not have any foresight of the natural and pro· 
bable consequences of that action-in-circumstances. 
For the most part, if it can be established that a person was 
unaware of the circumstances of his action, he will not be said to 
have acted intentionally in this first sense. Thus someone who, 
by genuine mistake, puts poisonous crystals instead of sugar into 
a cup of tea cannot be said to have intended to poison the tea. 
And, obviously, someone who is unaware of the true circumstances 
of his action cannot have foresight of its consequences and thus 
cannot be held to intend them. However, the law, for practical 
reasons, tends to each.er more objective tests than these, operating 
on the basis of the patentness of the circumstances34 and the for· 
seeability of the consequences to the ordinary, if somewhat my-
thical, reasonable man. 
It is at this level of intention that questions concerning the 
sanity of the accused are mainly treated as relevant. This is 
pointed to by the M'Naghten Rules which obtained in England 
from 184335 until the Homicide Act of 1957. They read in part: 'To 
establish a defence on the ground of insanity it must be clearly 
proved that, at the time of committing the act, the accused was 
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, 
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, 
33 Reflex actions also falling into this category according to the criteria 
discussed earlier. 
34 The law, in Scotland at least, does not expect knowledge of latent 
defects, such as a weak heart or an 'eggshell' skull. 
35 R. v. M'Naghten (1843) 10 01. & F. 200. The roles, in whole or in part, 
have also been incorporated into the law of a number of other systems. 
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if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was 
wrong'. 36 
The M'Naghten rules, however, were never fully adopted into 
Scots law, being regarded as unduly restrictive. And it is, in fact, 
difficult to make any clear statement as to how insanity is de­
fined in Scotland for legal purposes. It is regarded as appropriate 
to ask, though, whether the accused was capable of a normal 
understanding of the facts, a sound assessment of their signifi• 
cance and a sane appreciation of right and wrong. 37 Whether a
person is adjudged insane will be dependent on the extent to 
which his or her reason is regarded as alienated in any or all of 
these respects. 
The alternative to asking such questions at the level of inten­
tion is to adopt what is known as the causal approach. This in­
volves a decision by the jury as to whether the accused was suf­
fering from 'a mental disease, and whether the killing of his wife 
was the product of such disease'. 38 As Gordon points out39 this
approach gives rise to the considerable, but not necessarily insur­
mountable, problems that occur whereby causal judgments are 
concerned. Whether its greater flexibility- nonetheless renders it 
preferable to the 'intentional approach' is a moot point. 
It must, however, be admitted that testing insanity in terms of 
intention only is insufficient. For an accused person may be fully 
aware of the nature and quality of his act, but nevertheless be in­
capable of controlling his p art in it. And, in such instances, the 
questions to be asked are clearly causal ones. Yet arguments as 
to their precise status are often somewhat confused. 
In Attorney-General for South Australia v. Brown40 it was argued 
that the defence of irresistible impulse 'introduces a volitional 
exemption from liability which (unlike the cognitive rules of mens 
rea) is wholly unknown to the law'. This statement appears some­
what odd in view of th·e·-traditional equation of volition and volun· 
tariness and the extent to which the l aw excludes involuntaty 
'acts' from its scope or limits liability for them. The confusion 
probably arises from the fact that, on this traditional view, the 
'actor's' behaviour is regarded as involuntary because the element 
of volition is lacking - while with irresistible impulse it is, 
36Part of Rule 3 as set out by Gordon (op. cit. at p. 307) and as expressed
by the judges in the House of Lords. 
37 As opposed to mere capacity to fonnulate ideas of these.
31 An American (New Hampshire) case: State_ v. Pile 49 N.H. 399, per 
Doe, J.
39 Gordon, op. cit. p. 31S, 
40(1960] A.C. 432, 
32 
rather, there to an overwhelming extent. But if, as suggested 
earlier, voluntariness is to be properly understood in terms of the 
operation of causal factors that render nugatory any possibility of 
choice or control on the part of the accused, this objection falls. 
The other problem relating to irresistible impulse is raised by 
Gordon as follows 'Motive is always regarded as irrelevant to 
responsibility41 - it does not matter whether A steals out of greed 
or to save his starving baby - and irresistible impulse is a de-
fence that the motive of the crime was the desire to commit the 
crime'. But he continues 'It should be obvious, however, that 
where this desire is the result of insanity the question of motive 
does not really enter at all unless insanity is to be described as a 
motive. And if it is said that the motive was insanity it should be 
obvious that the accused was not responsible since, so to speak, 
"Twas not Ha ml et wronged you, but his madness'". 42 
And, in fact, this appears to be the basis of operation of the 
concept in most, if not all, ·the .legal systems that recognise it. 
Irresistible impulse, like automatism, is not a category per se - it 
must be linked to 'a disease which renders the accused incapable 
of acting according to his knowledge of the wrongness of the 
act' .43 Thus mental disease, in relation both to automatism and ir-
;, resistible impulse, ranks a long with physical disease or injury, 
coercion, duress and provocation amongst the causal factors that 
may be treated as rendering conduct involuntary. 
Another point, however, arises from Attomey·General for South 
Australia v. Brown, and that is the claim that the rules of mens 
rea are cognitive. This is clearly so in relation to the sense of 
intention discussed to date. But there is a second sense in which 
it may be relevant to the legal process. And this relates to the 
consequences of the accion·in·circumstances. It is argued that for 
an actus as a whole to have been intentional the accused must not 
only have been aware of the nature of his action-in-circumstances 
and had foresight of its consequences, he must also have intended 
these consequences. 
There has been considerable philosophical argument as to what 
is meant by intention in this second sense. It has been variously 
explained in terms of desire for and expectation of the consequen· 
ces. But one may desire certain events to occur without thereby 
intending them to do so. However much I may desire good weather 
tomorrow, I cannot intend the sun to shine. Nor, even though from 
41 This assertion has been disputed earlier in the pre sent text. 
42 Gordon, op. cit. p. 311, as also the previous extra. 
0 Gordon, op. cit. p. 310. 
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the weather forecast I may expect good weather tomorrow, I cannot 
be said to intend that it should happen. 
Without going into any detailed analysis of intention in this 
second sense, it is suggested that it cannot properly be explained 
in isolation from intention in the first sense; so also that it cannot 
properly be explained in isolation from the action or inaction 
deemed to be the cause of the consequences. Thus, tentatively, 
the consequences of an action are intended insofar as the action 
is performed (in knowledge of the circumstances and foresight of 
the possible consequences) with the purpose of bringing about 
those particular consequences and no others. (And it would seem 
that motives must form at least part of the basis of the inference 
and imputation of such purpose). 
The main defect of this attempted definition is that it may be 
far too narrow for legal purposes. For example, if someone throws 
a bomb into a crowded railway compartment and succeeds in his 
aim of hitting the Crown Prince of Ruritania, he will be guilty of 
murder - but only of the Crown Prince. Since the death of any 
other members of the party was a possible but not purposed con-
sequence of his action, his crime in their case is merely that of 
culpable homicide. 
For reasons such as this, the law does not normally embrace 
such a subjective view of intention but rather deems a man to 
intend the certain or virrually certain consequences of his actions. 
This does, however, distort the concept of intention and it is 
probably more satisfactory to adopt the Scots solution and to ex-
tend the scope of type of mens rea relevant to murder, viz: 'Murder 
is constituted by any wilful act causing the destruction of life, 
whether intended to kill, or displaying such wicked recklessness 
as to imply a disposition depraved enough to be regardless of 
consequences .•. 44 
By recklessness is to be understood the presence of intention· 
in the firscsense of the term - namely awareness of the circum-
stances and foresight of the consequences - with an action per-
petrated in disregard of the latter. The degree of recklessness 
involved is to be judged by reference to the blameworthiness of 
the accused and this in tum is affected by the nature of the con-
sequences that actually occurred and the likelihood of their having 
done so. 
There are obvious disadvantages in requiring a distinction to be 
made between different types of recklessness, particularly as 
44 J .H.A. Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scot-
land (Edinburgh, 1867) 5rh edn. 1948 p. 89. 
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evaluative criteria are involved and no hard and fast line can be 
drawn between the two. But some distinction must be made if a 
corresponding classification into murder and culpable homicide is 
to be maintained. And the problems involved in the opposite ap-
proach of stretching the concept of intention are even greater. 
For some time in England, following the case of D.P.P. v. 
Smith, 45 a person was deemed to intend not merely the certain or 
virtually certain consequences of his action but also the natural 
and probable ones. But such an approach leaves little or no scope 
for the concept of recklessness, besides judging the accused by a 
more objective standard than is always warranted. 
It should be added, though, that the concept of recklessness is 
not always well defined. Theoretically it involves a subjective 
test - a judgment about the actual state of mind of the accused: 
to the effect that awareness and foresight are present but purpose 
is lacking. And to this, in Scots law, may be added an objective 
test - an assessment of the culpability of the accused, based on 
what a reasonable man would do, given such awareness and fore-
sight. 
Negligence, by comparison, theoret.ically involves either lack 
of awareness or lack of foresight or both, with culpability for 
such where a reasonable man would have known or foreseen -
again a subjective and an objective test. But in practice the sub-
jective basis of both recklessness and negligence is often ignored. 
Given that intention in the second sense is not alleged, questions 
about intention in the first sense are ignored. Instead, the be-
haviour of the accused is judged by reference to the standard of 
the reasonable man and the line between recklessness and negli-
gence is drawn by reference to the grossness of the aberration 
from this standard. 
Given all the foregoing it does seem clear that a crime does not 
consist in a simple conjunction of actus rea and mens rea, as tra-
ditional theory would suggest. And the actual complexity of the 
situation can be demonstrated, although not exhauscively, 46 in the 
following diagrammatic fashion: 
45 [1961] A.C. 290, until reversed by the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, s. 8. 
46 e.g. the diagram ignores any role played by motive and oversimplifies 
certain relationships. For example provocation requires awareness of 
prior and perhaps immediate circumstances and duress foresight of con-
sequences, though not necessarily ones part of the actus reus. 
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Thus, al though the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens rea 
indicates the proper path, it is far from giving a comprehensive 
map of the route. 
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